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NOTES
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S COMPETI
TIVE ADVOCATE STANDING THEORY: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE MODEL
THEORY? A CALL FOR CHOICE

INTRODUCTION

Article III of the Constitution restricts federal court jurisdiction
to cases and controversies. I The Supreme Court has developed doc
trines of justiciability to help define the case and controversy limita
tion and the scope of federal judicial power. 2 Standing doctrine is one
such doctrine of justiciability.3
Standing is a threshold issue in federal court litigation4 in which
the court's inquiry is primarily focused on the party before the court
and secondarily focused on the issues to be decided. 5 To have stand
ing, a litigant must have a "sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
1. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (stating that the case or controversy
requirement is a "fundamental limit[] on federal judicial power"). Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Contro
versies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cI. 1.
2. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-1 (2d ed. 1988);
Susan Bandes, The Idea ofa Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227, 227 (1990). For a discussion of
the justiciability doctrines of mootness, ripeness, avoidance of advisory opinions, and stand
ing, see TRIBE, supra, §§ 3-7 to 3-14. The scope of this Note is limited to standing doc
trine, more specifically, competitive advocate standing.
3. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 107. Professor Tribe maintains that standing is
"[t]he doctrine most central to defining Article Ill's requirement of a 'case' or 'contro
versy.''' Id.
4. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (stating that standing is a "threshold
question in every federal case").
5. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 107.
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controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy."6 The
Supreme Court has interpreted standing to consist of two sets of re
quirements: Article III requirements and prudential requirements. 7
Article III requires that a litigant suffer injury in fact, that the injury
be traceable to the opposing party's conduct, and that the litigant's
injury be redressable by a judicial remedy. 8 Prudential requirements
are derived from a set of judicially self-imposed policy considerations. 9
If standing requirements are not satisfied, the federal court lacks sub
ject matter jurisdiction over the litigation and is unable to hear the
case. 10
Standing requirements, while easily stated, are in fact very diffi
cult to implement ll and even harder to reconcile. 12 One method of
conceptualizing the standing doctrine places the varying treatments of
standing on a bipolar continuum, marked by the private rights model
of federal court jurisdiction on one end and a public rights model of
federal court jurisdiction on the other end. The private model realm is
characterized by judicial reluctance to intervene l3 in disputes unless a
6. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See also Patricia M. Wald, The
D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 719 (1987) (Standing is "basi
cally ... used to decide who has enough stake in the controversy at hand to be recognized
by the court as capable of litigating the issue. ").
7. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 751. These policy considerations include avoiding decisions involving gen
eralized grievances, prohibiting the litigation of others' rights, and ensuring that a litigant's
interests are within the zone of interests protected by the statute sued under. Id. For a
more detailed discussion of prudential considerations, see infra notes 73-77 and accompa
nying text.
10. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (The standing inquiry determines a
court's "power ... to entertain the suit."); Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 731-32.
11. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989)
("Standing entails a complex ... inquiry."), cen. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobili
zation, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
12. Standing is one of the most controversial and amorphous elements of Article III
justiciability. See. e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221,
221-24 (1988) (arguing that because standing is in such a confused and "unhappy state of
affairs," it should be reduced to an inquiry into whether a plaintiff can claim relevant statu
tory or constitutional rights and sue for violations thereot); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and
the Disintegration of Article 111,74 CAL. L. REV. 1915, 1915 (1986) ("[A]fter almost two
hundred years, the judiciary has yet to outline successfully the parameters of a constitu
tional ·case.' "); Kevin A. Coyle, Comment, Standing of Third Panies to Challenge Admin
istrative Agency Actions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1988) (arguing that standing is
unclear because traditional Article III principles "have become intertwined with . . . ex
traconstitutional doctrines"); Jordana G. Schwartz, Note, Standing to Challenge Tax-Ex
empt Status: The Second Circuit's Competitive Political Advocate Theory, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 723, 724 (1990) (noting that standing determinations are the "most difficult compo
nent[s] of the case or controversy analysis").
13. See. e.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (stating that "federal courts may exercise power
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litigant is suing upon a right specific to that litigant. 14 Thus, claims
common to the general population are beyond the private rights realm
and cannot be judicially redressed in a lawsuit brought by a private
litigant. The public model realm, on the other hand, is characterized
by a broad judicial willingness to construe and enforce the Constitu
tion and federallaw.1 s Relying upon the public model, courts can rec
ognize broader claims so that they can rule on the merits and, if
necessary, enforce the government's compliance with the law.1 6
Though courts do not typically announce which conceptual realm
they are grounding their standing analysis upon, commentators have
argued that a court's choice of conceptual realm determines the out
come of the standing decision and, ultimately, the scope of federal
court power. 17 The courts' failure to enunciate the model of judicial
authority upon which their standing analysis is predicated has at
tracted criticism. 18 Commentators have argued that failure to identify
the underlying analytical model has produced confusion, lack of gui
dance, contradictory results, and opportunity for courts to base their
standing analysis on the attractiveness of the underlying merits.1 9
A recent Second Circuit decision, In re United States Catholic
Conference,2o illustrates how a court's failure to articulate the analyti
cal framework can produce the confusion and lack of guidance that
characterizes modem standing doctrine. In Catholic Conference, the
only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity'" (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892))).
14. The private rights model is predicated upon a right-duty relationship. See Cass
R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization ofPublic Law, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1434
35 (1988). In other words, a litigant has standing to sue only where the opposing party
breached a duty that they owed to the litigant. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the derivations of the private rights model.
15. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-2; Bandes, supra note 2, at 281 (discussing the fed
eral courts' primary purpose as interpreting and enforcing existing law and the Constitu
tion); Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1446-47 (making the distinction between the private
model basis in the right-duty relationship and public model basis in ensuring the govern
ment's fidelity to the law).
16. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1446-47.
17. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 227 (arguing that the adoption of one of the concep
tual models is "a primary issue of constitutional interpretation" because it "delineates the
reach of the federal judicial power").
18. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at III ("The aspect of the Court's standing
jurisprudence most open to criticism ... [is] the Court's lack of candor in articulating and
justifying the basic choice (between private or public law models] it has made.").
19. See generally id.; Bandes, supra note 2, at 319 (concluding that failure to adopt a
model "leads to incoherence and unpredictability, as well as to a lack of judicial accounta
bility"); Sunstein, supra note 14.
20. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobiliza
tion, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
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court denied the plaintiffs, political advocates, standing to sue using a
new theory of standing, competitive advocate standing. 21 The court,
however, failed to explicitly identify the analytical framework upon
which competitive advocate standing is based. Moreover, competitive
advocate standing has a dual nature: as stated by the court, competi
tive advocate standing elicits public realm traits; however, the court's
application of the theory elicits strong private realm traits.22 Thus,
Catholic Conference fails to provide clear guidance on how to interpret
competitive advocate standing..
Another Second Circuit decision, Fulani v. League of Women
Voters Education Fund, 23 further complicates the interpretation of
competitive advocate theory. In League of Women Voters, a Second
Circuit panel granted a plaintiff standing to sue using a political com
petition theory very similar to competitive advocate standing. Here
too, the court failed to enunciate the analytical framework upon which
its standing analysis was predicated. Like the Catholic Conference
analysis, the League of Women Voters analysis can be interpreted as
adopting either private or public models of federal court jurisdiction. 24
Thus, League of Women Voters also fails to give adequate guidance to
lower courts and litigants.
The Second Circuit's current formulation of competitive advocate
21. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-31. Competitive advocate standing theory
recognizes a unique Article III injury in fact: the impairment of a political advocate's
ability to compete with fellow competitor political advocates because the government has
conferred an unfair advantage upon fellow competitor advocates by enforcing the law in a
discriminatory manner. Id. at 1028-29. The court's acknowledgement of this injury en
ables a claimant to comply with constitutional standing requirements provided that the
claimant shows a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's injury
in fact. To have standing, the claimant must further satisfy judicially imposed prudential
limitations. Id. at 1029 n.2, 1031; see also Schwartz, supra note 12 (discussing the formula
tion of competitive advocate standing and arguing that it was misapplied in Catholic Con
ference). For a discussion of competitive advocate standing and its derivations, see infra
notes 83-98 and accompanying text.
The court's standing analysis also included three other standing theories: clergy
standing, taxpayer standing, and voter standing. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1024-28.
The court denied the plaintiffs standing to sue under these alternative standing theories as
well. Id. For a discussion of the relationship between voter standing and competitive ad
vocate standing, see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 157-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of competitive
advocate standing's dual nature.
23. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989). League of Women Voters was decided one month
prior to Catholic Conference. Judge Cardamone, the one judge involved in both Catholic
Conference and League of Women Voters, wrote the majority opinion in Catholic Confer
ence and, while concurring with the League of Women Voters majority on the merits,
strongly disagreed with the League of Women Voters majority's standing analysis. See in
fra note 110.
24. See infra notes 181-97, 209-10 and accompanying text.
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standing may create confusion and contradictory results in future
competitive advocate cases. A court could seize upon either interpre
tation of competitive advocate standing, public or private, to justify
whichever standing decision it wished to make. This current ambigu
ity in competitive advocate standing might allow a court to render its
standing decision based on the attractiveness of the underlying merits
and then justify the decision by pointing to the interpretive model that
supports the particular holding.
This Note suggests that the Second Circuit select and then clearly
state the analytical framework that competitive advocate standing is
based upon in order to provide clearer guidance to lower courts and
litigants, avoid contradictory standing outcomes, and ensure some de
gree of accountability. Although not a panacea, the adoption of one
model would expose the driving aspect of standing analysis, the under
lying analytical framework, to frank and open discussion.
Section I reviews the history and current requirements of stand
ing doctrine. Section II reviews the requirements of competitive advo
cate standing and discusses the facts and holdings of two Second
Circuit standing cases, Catholic Conference and League of Women
Voters. Section III analyzes competitive advocate standing under both
the public and private models of judicial authority to demonstrate
competitive advocate standing's dual nature. Section III ends by pro
posing a more specific form of competitive advocate standing, labeled
partisan electoral standing, that is based on the private model of judi
cial authority. Partisan electoral standing provides a basis on which to
reconcile the two Second Circuit decisions. This Note concludes by
suggesting that the Second Circuit clarify its approach to competitive
advocate standing by articulating the theory's interpretive basis. This
Note further suggests that such a clarification may produce more con
sistent results and reduce lower court confusion.
I.

HISTORY AND CURRENT REQUIREMENTS
OF STANDING DOCTRINE

Standing doctrine is based on the case or controversy limitation
that Article III of the Constitution places upon federal courtS.2S A
federal court may assume jurisdiction only after it has determined that
the claimant has established a case or controversy.26 A claimant can
meet the case or controversy requirements of Article III by showing
25. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
26. Id. See supra note 1, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1 for case and controversy
limitation.
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that a sufficient injury in fact exists and that there is a causal nexus
between the defendant's conduct and the claimant's injury.27 In addi
tion to these constitutional requirements, the claimant may have to
satisfy judicially imposed prudentiallimitations. 28
This Section will trace the evolution of standing doctrine from its
constitutional roots through its modem treatment. It will also provide
an historical basis for the private and public rights models of federal
court jurisdiction.
A.

Standing History

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, standing doc
trine did not exist as a distinct body oflaw. 29 A plaintiff could bring a
suit in federal court only if his or her claim sought to enforce rights
protected by the common law, the Constitution, or a statute. 30
This early concept of federal court power was predicated upon
the private rights model interpretation of Marbury v. Madison. 31 This
interpretation viewed as the federal courts' primary purpose the decid
ing of disputes between private parties. 32 The federal courts' power to
interpret the Constitution was incidental to this role and used only
when necessary in resolving the private parties' dispute. 33 Thus, under
a private model analysis, standing inquiries in suits against the govern
ment were limited to instances where the government breached a con
stitutional, common law, or statutory duty that it owed to a litigant.
Litigants merely asserting that the government failed to adhere to a
statute were forced to resort to other non-judicial means to redress
27. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
Id.; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying
text for a discussion of prudential limitations.
29. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 224-25; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434 ("For most of
the nation's history, there was no distinctive body of standing doctrine.").
30. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 224; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434 (stating that
"standing depended on whether positive law created a cause of action"). See generally
JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE CoMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 20-33 (1978).
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Commentators argue that because Marbury v.
Madison "emphasized the necessity for judicial protection of vested or legal rights," Mar
bury provided a basis for the private rights model of judicial power. Nichol, supra note 12,
at 1919-20. Marbury also provides an interpretive basis for the public law model ofjudicial
authority, the antithesis. to the private model. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the public model.
32. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 277; Nichol, supra note 12, at 1920 (courts were
restricted to arbitrating disputes involving private rights between private parties); Coyle,
supra note 12, at 1068; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434-35.
33. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 277.
28.
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these injuries. 34 Courts would not imply a private right of action for
these litigants.
During the 1930's, standing doctrine evolved into a distinct body
of legal principles. This evolution was a reaction to the rapid growth
of administrative agencies and an increase in litigation over adminis
trative agencies' obligations. 3s Courts used early standing doctrine to
determine which parties could sue to compel a governmental agency
to fulfill its legal obligations. 36 The doctrine was based on a legal in
terest testY Under this test, if a statute clearly granted standing to
the plaintiff in a particular context, a court could grant standing to
sue. 38 If, on the other hand, the statute was silent on the issue of
standing, courts would grant standing only if the violated right was
actionable in common law property, tort, or contract. 39 Thus, the
legal interest test was a mixture of statutory and common law
notions. 40
In the 1960's, the federal courts began to expand the legal interest
34. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434-35.
35. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 225. See generally Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1434
39. Courts and commentators have likened agencies to a "fourth branch" of government.
FfC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
36. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 225.
37. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38
(1939), overruled by Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Coyle, supra note 12, at 1068 (stating that the legal interest test provided a
"framework" for the determination of standing).
38. Likewise, if the statute clearly denied standing, then the court would not grant
standing. See. e.g., Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, § 5, 48 Stat. 8, 9 (veterans'
benefits). This Act precluded judicial review of an agency's refusal of a veteran's benefits
regardless of whether the veteran had an independent basis for standing. Id. See also
Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227.
39. Tennessee Power, 306 U.S. at 137-38 (stating that parties lacked standing to sue
under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act "unless the right invaded is a legal right,-<me
of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers privilege"); Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227.
40. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 226; see Tennessee Power, 306 U.S. at 137-38.
The legal interest test was predicated upon the private rights model of Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. Mc
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Nichol, supra note 12, at
1919-20. Professor Sunstein argues that New Dea1-era courts adopted the private rights
model in order to insulate the newly created New Deal agencies from judicial attack. See
Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1437-38.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 ("A.P.A.") restated the federal courts'
methods of determining standing under the legal interest test, declaring: "Any person suf
fering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such
[agency] action within the meaning of any relevant statute" had standing to sue to enforce
that agency's actions. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § IOI(a), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988». See also, Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227; but see
Antonin Scalia. The Doctrine 0/ Standing as an Essential Element 0/ the Separation 0/ Pow
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test. Some courts implied rights of action in suits against the govern
ment and granted standing where litigants could show that they were
regulatory beneficiaries. 41 To determine if a litigant was a regulatory
beneficiary, courts analyzed the statute to determine the scope of its
protection and then determined whether the litigant's interests fell
within the statute's scope of protection. A court could imply a right of
action if the litigant's interests were protected by the statute. 42 In ad
dition, the Supreme Court liberalized the legal interest test to include
voter 43 and taxpayer44 challenges to agency actions. 45
The Supreme Court's decision in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 46 further "liberalized access to the
federal courts"47 by rejecting the legal interest test48 and replacing it
with a two step analysis. First, the plaintiff had to show an injury in
fact.49 Second, the plaintiff's interest had to be "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or consti
ers, 17 SUFFOLK u. L. REV. 881, 887 (1983) (arguing that the A.P.A. did not merely
restate existing federal court practice, but instead "broadened the traditional rules").
41. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
l()()()-06 (D:C. Cir. 1966) (standing granted to members of television audience to argue
against a broadcast license renewal based on a statutory analysis of the Federal Communi
cations Act); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965) (standing granted to users of the environment based upon a
statutory analysis of the Federal Power Act).
42. See cases cited supra note 41.
43. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (allowing voters to challenge a legislative
apportionment plan).
44. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (allowing a taxpayer to challenge government
allocation of tax revenues authorized by Congress under the Article I, § 8, Taxing and
Spending Clause of the Constitution).
45. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227-28 (describing the growing attempts to sue gov
ernment agencies by individuals with no injury different from the general populace);
Nichol, supra note 12, at 1920 (noting the "[l]iberalized judicial review of administrative
decisionmaking"); Coyle, supra note 12, at 1070 (noting that as litigation against govern
ment agencies increased, courts correspondingly broadened standing requirements "well
beyond the narrow interests of the actual litigants").
46. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
47. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1921; see also Data Processing, 397 U.s. at 154 (Writing
for the majority, Justice Douglas noted that, at least where statutes were concerned, courts
had been granting standing to challenge administrative actions to larger classes of people.).
48. The Court stated: "The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of
standing is different." Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. In other words, the legal interest
test was no longer considered part of the threshold standing inquiry reached before a deci
sion on the merits. See also Nichol, supra note 12, at 1921 (noting that the Court in Data
Processing replaced the legal interest test with an injury in fact requirement).
49. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152. Instead of having to show that a private right
was violated, plaintiffs were able to claim more abstract injuries in fact. See. e.g., cases
cited infra note 51.
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tutional guarantee in question."so Following Data Processing, the
Court granted standing to claimants in a variety of cases that would
previously have been dismissed for lack of standing. s1 Often the inju
ries found in these cases were difficult to distinguish from injuries to
the general public. S2
Commentators have argued that Data Processing-era cases sig
naled a trend towards the use of a public law model of judicial power
as the interpretive basis of standing; federal courts were said to be
more concerned with enforcing government fidelity to the law than
with restricting themselves to private disputes only.s3 The public law
model, based upon a broad interpretation of Marbury v. Madison,s4
views as the federal courts' primary role the power to construe and
enforce the Constitution and federal law. ss Thus, litigants have a
SO. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153. The purpose of the "zone of interests" analysis
is to determine whether "in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action pre
sumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular
agency decision." Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). Only if "the
plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in
the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit"
will a court deny standing. Id. This standard of judicial review "is not meant to be espe
cially demanding." Id.
"Zone of interests" is a concept used to describe the individual interests that a statute
or constitutional guarantee is intended to protect. See id. at 399-400; Data Processing, 397
U.S. at 153-54.
51. See. e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding
that injury to interracial association interest grounded in 1968 Civil Rights Act was suffi
cient to grant standing); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (allowing citizen-tax
payers to sue the government to challenge government grants to religious universities). See
also Nichol, supra note 12, at 1921 (noting that in the period following Data Processing, the
Supreme Court recognized claims that "federal courts would have rejected in earlier eras");
Wald, supra note 6, at 720 (stating that the period after Data Processing was a "new era of
broadened standing").
52. See cases cited supra note 51. See also Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227 (noting
that many of the attempts to sue government agencies in the 1960's and 1970's involved
litigants asserting injuries not markedly different from those that most of the population
could claim); Nichol, supra note 12, at 1922 (noting that many plaintiffs claimed injuries
"widely shared among the populace"); Wald, supra note 6, at 719-20 (noting that before
the mid-1970's, a broad variety of injuries were found to satisfy standing requirements).
Injuries common to the general populace violate the private model principle of al
lowing federal courts jurisdiction only where the litigant sues upon a right specific to the
litigant (e.g., tort, contract, and constitutional rights). See supra notes 31-34. Thus, under
a private model analysis, courts would not grant standing to litigants that assert injuries
common to all.
53. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 227; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1446, 1450-51
n.85.
54. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
55. See id. at 176-77 (stating that federal courts have the power to assess the consti
tutionality of congressional acts); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-2; Sunstein, supra note 14, at
1450 -5 1.
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broader claim to standing under a public model analysis. They can
assert that the government has acted unlawfully by not enforcing the
law, as opposed to being restricted to standing, under a private model,
only where the government has breached a duty owed to the litigant. 56
The Burger Court reacted to this trend of liberalized access to the
courts "by substantially tightening the Data Processing test."57 Com
mentators have argued that this restrictive trend is based on a return
to the private rights model of judicial power. 58 This trend has contin
ued and is the basis for modern standing requirements. S9
B.

Modern Standing Requirements

Modern standing doctrine has been divided into two sets of con
siderations: Article III constitutional considerations and judicially
56. In support of the public law model, Professor Bandes argues, "First, the federal
courts are best suited to the task of constitutional adjudication. Second, they were origi
nally conceived for that purpose. Third, and alternatively, constitutional interpretation
and enforcement have become their primary role since the Civil War. And fourth, this role
is the most efficient use of judicial resources." Bandes, supra note 2, at 281-82 (footnotes
omitted).
57. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1923; see also Wald, supra note 6, at 720. For two
examples of the more stringent Burger Court standard, see Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982), and
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). The Court in Valley Forge found that the plaintiffs
lacked a sufficiently particularized injury in fact and denied standing to plaintiffs challeng
ing Congress' allocation of land to a religious college. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485, 489
90.
The plaintiffs in Allen were parents of black school children who alleged that the In
ternal Revenue Service lacked adequate standards and procedures to ensure that racially
discriminatory private schools were denied tax-exempt status. The result, plaintiffs argued,
was that the Internal Revenue Service awarded tax-exempt status to some racially discrimi
natory private schools. The plaintiffs further argued that because of the discriminatory
private schools' tax-exempt status, the schools were able to stay open and enroll white
students who would otherwise attend public schools.
The Supreme Court recognized the parents' injury in fact as "their children's dimin
ished ability to receive an education in a racially integrated [public] school." Allen, 468
U.S. at 756. However, the Court denied plaintiffs standing to sue because the parents failed
to satisfy the causal nexus requirement; revocation of the racially discriminatory private
schools' tax-exempt status was held not to be sufficiently certain to facilitate public school
racial integration. Id. at 758-59.
58. See BandeS, supra note 2, at 229 (arguing that recent federal court decisions
indicate an "unstated acceptance of the private rights model").
59. "It is clear ... that the Court has selectively employed standing doctrine ... to
constrict the expansive access to federal courts previously enjoyed by litigants challenging
governmental action." TRIBE, supra note 2, at 110; see also Nichol, supra note 12, at 1923
24; Wald, supra note 6, at 720 (stating that the trend to tighten standing requirements,
which began in the mid-1970's, has continued and has become such a "paramount focus of
[the federal courts] ... that [n]o plaintiff ... can afford ... to be unprepared to defend
standing").
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imposed prudential .considerations. 60 These considerations are in
tended to effectuate the limitation Article III places upon federal
courts to hear only cases and controversies. 61 Failure to satisfy both
constitutional and prudential considerations will result in denial of
standing.62
The Article III constitutional considerations consist of three
"core component[s]."63 A plaintiff must (1) show a "distinct and pal
pable"64 injury in fact 65 that is (2) "fairly traceable to the defendant's
allegedly unlawful conduct and [(3)] likely to be redressed by the re
quested relief. "66 The injury in fact must not be " 'abstract' or 'conjec
tural' or 'hypothetical.' "67 Abstract interests lacking a palpable
injury fail standing requirements. 68 Injury requirements have been ar
gued as necessary to ensure that a claimant has a "personal stake" in
the litigation,69 to weed out overly abstract cases,70 and to encourage
60. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750-51; see also Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471; TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 3-14, at 107.
61. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (Article III requirements "state fundamental limits on
federal judicial power in our system of government.").
62. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) (stat
ing that if both Article III and prudential considerations are not met, courts will deny
standiilg). For a discussion of Gladstone, see Vernon Gorton, Note, Standing to Sue in
Federal Court: The Direct Injury Standard-Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91 (1979), 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 793 (1980).
Additionally, when determining whether a plaintiff has met standing requirements, a
court must read the plaintiff's complaint in a favorable light. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975).
63. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
64. Id. (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501».
65. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1974) (stat
ing that the "essence [of a case or controversy] requirement is a[n] 'injury in fact' ") (quot
ing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970»;
see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. Commentators have argued, however, that courts place less
weight upon the injury requirement or, in some instances, drop the injury requirement
altogether in favor of a zone of interests analysis. See Fletcher, supra note 12, at 264;
Coyle, supra note 12, at 1078; infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
66. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
67. Id.; see also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983); O'Shea v. Lit
tleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). Courts often restate the avoidance of abstract injury
requirement by insisting on a "concrete" injury. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220-21; In re
United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub
nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct.
1946 (1990).
68. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982).
69. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962); Nichol, supra note 12, at 1927 (noting
the value of actual injury requir~ments).
70. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1927.
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self- determination,11 The second and third prongs of traceability and
redressability are "essentially ... a causal nexus between the plaintiff's
injury and the defendant's assertedly unlawful act."72
Courts impose further limiting principles upon themselves to ef
fectuate Article III case and controversy limits. 73 These additional
limiting principles, commonly referred to as prudential considerations,
require a court to deny standing, even when,Article III considerations
are met,74 if (1) a litigant raises another person's legal rights;75 (2) a
litigant attempts to litigate subject matter that unnecessarily forces a
court to intrude on another branch's dominion; 76 or (3) a litigant's
claim is not protected by a statute or constitutional guarantee's "zone
of interests."77
The Article III and prudential considerations that make up mod
ern standing doctrine are predicated on the separation of powers prin
ciple. 78 The Supreme Court views standing doctrine as a tool to
effectuate the limited role federal courts should play in a democratic
71. Id. Injury in fact requirements encourage the most directly injured persons to
litigate their own rights.
72. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1024 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Confer
ence, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
73. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,99-100 (1979) (pruden
tial considerations are used "to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.").
74. Id.
75. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
76. Id.; see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222
(1974) (denying standing in part because the relief sought would have "produc[ed] a con
frontation with one of the coordinate branches of the Government"); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (stating that courts lack "confidence in [hearing] cases ... where a
taxpayer seeks to employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized griev
ances about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System").
This second. limitation is also known as the avoidance of generalized grievances limitation.
See infra note 77 for the Supreme Court's discussion of prudential considerations in AI/en.
77. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 106.
The Supreme Court in AI/en articulated the prudential considerations as:
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of
interests protected by the law invoked.
AI/en, 468 U.S. at 751.
78. AI/en, 468 U.S. at 752 ("Article III standing is built on a single basic idea-the
idea of separation of powers. "). But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Com
ment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985) (arguing against standing based
upon separation of powers).
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society as authorized by Article 111.79 This narrow view of judicial
authority seeks to avoid "overjudicialization of the processes of self
governance" by avoiding unnecessary conflicts with other government
branches. 8o It is also intended to foster democratic accountability
(persons denied standing will be forced to challenge government ac
tions by other means, such as lobbying, grass roots political cam
paigns, etc.) and free up the federal courts for claims properly before
the courtS. 81 The separation of powers principle appears to be
grounded in an interpretation of Marbury v. Madison approximating
the private rights model because it effectively screens out broad claims
asserting the government's failure to enforce a law. 82
II.

COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING AND ITS ApPLICATION
IN CASE LAW

A.

Competitive Advocate Standing

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated
a new theory of standing that it called "competitive advocate stand
ing."83 Under this theory, a court may grant standing to political ad
vocates who are unable to effectively compete with a fellow competitor
advocate because the government has conferred unfair advantages on
the competitor advocate by enforcing the law in a discriminatory man
79. Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. Standing helps to weed out cases that, if admitted, would
turn federal courts into a " 'forum in which to air . . . generalized grievances about the
conduct of government.''' Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 483 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106).
80. Scalia, supra note 40, at 881-82 (arguing that the framers incorporated the sepa
ration of powers principle into Article III, and that this principle is best effectuated by
strictly requiring concrete and particularized injury); see also TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14,
at 108-09 (asserting that separation of powers principles were implicit in Burger Court
decisions before being expressly recognized in Allen).
81. Nichol, supra note 12, at 1916-17; see also C. Douglas Floyd, The Justiciability
Decisions o/the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 862, 869 (1985); Scalia, supra note
40, at 894-97.
82. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 110 (describing the Supreme Court's trend
towards more restrictive standing requirements and arguing that implicit in this trend is an
adoption of the private rights model of Marbury v. Madison); Bandes, supra note 2, at 277
("The view of the separation of powers ... assumes that the role of the judiciary is solely to
decide the rights of individuals."). In addition, the Supreme Court's interpretation of in
jury in fact as requiring concrete injury and its prudential requirement of avoidance of
generalized grievances indicates use of the private model because these concepts help weed
out claims common to the general population. See supra note 67 for a discussion of con
crete injury; see supra note 76 for a discussion of generalized grievances.
83. See In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023-24 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic
Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990); see also Schwartz, supra note 12.
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ner.84 In other words, a sufficient injury in fact exists where the gov
ernment's discriminatory enforcement of the law unfairly tilts the
playing field in favor of one political advocate over a fellow competitor
political advocate. 85
Competitive advocate standing differs from the traditional stand
ing model requiring a "direct withholding of a benefit due the plain
tiff"86 because it recognizes the benefit unfairly conferred upon
competitor advocates as sufficient injury. This form of injury is thus
slightly broader than the traditional standing model; it recognizes the
less direct injury of increased competitive advantage conferred upon
political competitors.
Competitive advocate standing is derived from two principal
sources: voter standing theory and the economic competitor standing
theory.87 In voter standing cases, courts have granted standing to liti
gants where the government's actions restrict the litigants from effec
tively participating in the political process as voters. 88 This theory
recognizes as sufficient injury a reduction in the litigants' voting
power.89
Competitive a9vocate standing and voter standing share a com
mon basis in political inequity: both theories recognize injuries that
occur when the government's failure to enforce the law evenhandedly
84.

Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-29; see also Schwartz, supra note 12, at

723.
85. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029. In addition to satisfying this fonn of
injury in fact, complainants must still satisfy the remaining constitutional and prudential
considerations. Id. at 1029 n.2, 1031.
86. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 726.
87. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028-29.
88. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962); see also JoAnne L. Dunec, Note,
Voter Standing: A New Means for Third Parties to Challenge the Tax-Exempt Status of
Nonprofit Organizations?, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 453, 465 (1989).
89. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08 (recognizing sufficient injury where enforcement
of a statute placed voters "in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable ineqUality vis-a-vis
voters in irrationally favored counties"); Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028.
The district court originally granted standing to the plaintiffs in Catholic Conference
using the voter standing theory. See Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F.
Supp. 471, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd sub nom. In re United States Catholic Conference,
885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cerro denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v.
United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). The district court argued that
non-enforcement of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) against the Catholic Church dis
torted the political process and thus justified granting voters, participants in the political
process, standing. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision stating that the "plaintiffs' asserted basis for standing has nothing to do with vot
ing." Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1028. See generally Dunec, supra note 88, for a
discussion of voter standing in earlier Catholic Conference decisions. See infra note 101 for
a discussion of Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) requirements.
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distorts the political process. Voter standing, however, requires that
the political inequity affect a litigant's voting power. 90 Competitive
advocate standing, on the other hand, requires that the political in
equity affect a litigant's ability to compete with fellow political
competitors.
The Second Circuit further developed competitive advocate
standing by relying on the Supreme Court's economic competitor
cases. 91 In these cases, the Supreme Court granted standing to parties
who could show that the government's failure to enforce relevant laws
conferred unfair economic advantages upon the parties' competitors. 92
For example, the plaintiffs in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp 93 challenged a federal comptroller's rul
ing allowing banks, such as the defendant's bank, to foray into the
data processing field and make data processing services available to
clients and other banks.94 The plaintiffs, data processors, claimed that
the Comptroller's ruling violated sections of the National Bank Act,
including a provision prohibiting banks from "engag[ing] in any activ
ity other than the performance of bank services for banks. "95 The
Court, calling the case a "competitor's suit,"96 found that injury in fact
existed where "competition by national banks in the business of pro
viding data processing services might entail some future loss of profits
for the petitioners."97 The Second Circuit reasoned that the Supreme
Court's recognition of injury to competitors in the economic realm
justified recognizing injuries to competitors in the political realm. 98
90. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08.
91. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029. The Catholic Conference court relied
upon Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
479 U.S. 388 (1987); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours,
Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam); and Association of Data Processing Serv.
Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 730-31
(arguing that the Second Circuit's competitive advocate standing theory is "analytically
identical" to District of Columbia cases recognizing harm to political competitiveness as
sufficient injury in fact).
92. See cases cited supra note 91.
93. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
94. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 151.
95. Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, § 4, 76 Stat. 1132 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1988».
96. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152.
97. Id.
98. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989), cert
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference,
110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990) (stating that "political competitors arguably should fare as well" as
economic competitors).
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Competitive Advocate Standing Case Law
1.

Fulani v. League of Women Voters Education Fund 99

In League of Women Voters, the Second Circuit recognized an
Article III injury in fact that was very similar to that recognized by
the competitive adYocate standing theory.loo The defendant, the
League of Women Voters Education Fund ("the League"), was a tax
exempt, non-profit association organized under Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.c.") § 501(c)(3).lol The League aimed to educate voters
and encourage participation in the electoral process l02 by sponsoring
three nationally televised primary debates, two for the contenders for
the 1988 Democratic presidential nomination and one for the contend
ers for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination. lo3 The plaintiff,
Dr. Lenora Fulani, an independent and minor party presidential can
didate, attempted to participate in the League sponsored debates. The
League denied her participation because she was not seeking to be
either the Democratic or Republican presidential nominee. 104 Fulani
appealed an unsuccessful attempt to enjoin the League from con
99. 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. Referring to League 0/ Women Voters, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia stated, "The Second Circuit accepted Fulani's theory of competitor standing
...." Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912
(1992).
101. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1988). I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) confers tax-exempt status to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, lit
erary, or educational purposes, ... no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to infiuence legislation (except
as otherwise provided in subsection (h», and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
In addition to tax exemption, tax-exempt organizations may receive tax deductible
contributions pursuant to I.R.C. § 170(c) (1988). The Code, however, requires a trade off
for these benefits. Tax-exempt organizations cannot devote a substantial portion of their
activities towards infiuencing legislation or campaigning ("electioneering"). Regan v. Tax
ation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (holding the trade off of no
electioneering for tax exemption constitutional). See also, 26 C.F.R. 1.501(c)(3)-I(b)(3)
(1991); In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1022 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference,
110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990) (tax-exempt organizations must restrain their "right to try and
influence the political process" or face revocation of their tax-exempt status). But see Rev.
Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 ("Certain 'voter education' activities conducted in a non
partisan manner may not constitute prohibited political activity under section 501(c)(3).").
102. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir.
1989).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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ducting the debates without her participation. lOS
Fulani claimed that the League's failure to invite her to the de
bates constituted "partisan" activities because the League "structured
the debate phase of its primary election voter education program in
such a way as to favor the two traditional major parties, and to ex
clude significant independent and minor party candidates such as her
self."I06 Because these allegedly "partisan" activities violated the
League's tax-exempt charter under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Fulani re
quested that the court revoke the League's tax-exempt statuS.107
A Second Circuit panel noted that the "powerful beneficial effect
... [of the] mass media ... [can confer] some competitive advan
tage"108 to participants in televised debates. The court found a suffi
cient injury in fact in the "loss of competitive advantage flowing from
the League's exclusion of Fulani from the national debates."I09 Suffi
cient injury existed where the government's allegedly preferential en
forcement of the laws significantly benefitted one political competitor
over another.110
2. In re United States Catholic Conference III
One month after deciding League of Women Voters, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Catholic Conference .112 In
Catholic Conference the Second Circuit expressly articulated competi
tive advocate standing theory, a theory that also recognized competi
tive political injury as a sufficient Article III injury in fact. The
plaintiffs in Catholic Conference consisted of three organizations with
105. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989).
106. League of Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 624.
107. [d.
108. [d. at 626.
109. [d.
110. [d. After finding that Fulani satisfied the second and third prongs of the Article
III constitutional considerations, the court granted Fulani standing to sue. The court then
held against Fulani on the merits, stating that the "League's exclusion of [Fulani] from its
primary season debates did not constitute 'partisan' activity in contravention of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)." [d. at 630.
Judge Cardamone's concurring opinion agreed with the final holding, but disagreed
with the majority's method in reaching the holding. [d. (Cardamone, J., concurring). He
found that Fulani failed to meet the second and third prongs of the constitutionality test
and, therefore, lacked standing to sue. [d. at 630-33. No consideration of the merits
would then have been necessary.
111. 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
112. [d.
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tax-exempt charters under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3),113 one organization with
a tax-exempt charter under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4),lI4 and twenty individu
als (mainly Protestant ministers and Jewish rabbis).lIs All of the
plaintiffs believed in a woman's right to a legal abortion. 116
The plaintiffs claimed that the Catholic Church ("the Church")
violated statutes governing the Church's tax-exempt statUS.117 They
claimed that the Church devoted a substantial portion of its activities
towards influencing the political process by "electioneering,"
campaigning for and indirectly financing pro-life candidates. liS The
plaintiffs contended that the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") knew
of the violations yet chose to look the other way.119 They claimed that
the I.R.S. sheltered the Church from the tax law by not taking appro
priate actions to ensure that the Church complied with tax exemption
rules. 120 Because other tax-exempt organizations, like those in Catho
113. The three I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations were Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., the National Women's Health Network, Inc., and the Women's Center for Reproduc
tive Health. Id. at 1021; Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471,
474 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (listing the Women's Center for Reproductive Health as an I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) organization).
114. The one I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organization was the Long Island National Organi
zation for Women. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1021.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1022. The Church is an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization. Id. at 1021-22.
For a discussion of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requirements, see supra note 101.
118. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022.
119. Id. The plaintiffs originally filed the suit against the I.R.S. and the Church.
The district court granted the Church's motion to dismiss itself as a defendant in 1982.
Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 544 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("ARM
I"), rev'd sub nom. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Confer
ence, 110 S. Ct. 19460.990). In 1982 and 1985, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs
had standing to sue the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Reve
nue. ARM 1,544 F. Supp. at 491-50a; Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. Regan, 603 F.
Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("ARM II"), rev'd sub nom. In re United States Catholic Con
ference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). The standing issues in
Catholic Conference arose after the Church, as a non-party witness, refused to comply with
the plaintiffs' discovery requests. The Church claimed that the plaintiffs did not satisfy
standing requirements and, therefore, should not be able to litigate. The appellate court
said that the Church lacked standing to challenge the plaintiffs' standing and held the
Church in contempt. In re United States Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156 (2d Cir.
1987), rev'd sub nom. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization,
Inc., 487 U.S. 72 (1988). The Supreme Court reversed and held that because the Church
was a non-party witness held in contempt, it had standing to challenge the plaintiffs' stand
ing. United States Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72
(1988). Therefore, to settle the discovery requests at issue, the appellate court first had to
settle the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue the government.
120. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1022.
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lic Conference, still had to abide by the same tax exemption statutes,
the plaintiffs claimed that the I.R.S. treated the Church preferen
tially.12l They wanted the I.R.S. to revoke the Church's tax-exempt
status, "collect the resulting back taxes, and . .. notify contributors to
the Catholic Church that they may no longer claim their donations as
deductions on their income tax retums."122
In its majority opinion, a Second Circuit panel found that the
plaintiffs lacked sufficient injury in fact 123 and thus did not satisfy
competitive advocate standing requirements. 124 The court grounded
its finding on two premises: (1) the plaintiffs were not "competitors"
with the Church within the meaning of competitive advocate standing
theory; 125 and (2) the plaintiffs' claimed injury was not sufficiently par
ticularized. 126 The court found that the plaintiffs and the Church
were not competitors in the same political arena because the plaintiffs
chose "not to match the Church's alleged electioneering with their
own."127 The Catholic Conference majority required exact, "per
sonal" competition between competitor political advocates because
such personal competition was viewed as implicit in the relied upon
economic competitor cases. 128
The court found that the plaintiffs did not suffer a sufficiently par
ticularized injury in fact because the plaintiffs did not "plead[] that
they were personally denied equal treatment."129 The fact that the
Church was electioneering had no bearing on the plaintiffs unless they
too tried to electioneer and were personally denied equal opportunity
to do SO.130 The plaintiffs would have to show injury on the political
campaign field to satisfy the injury in fact requirement. 13l The court
held that even if they were to recognize an alternative view of the
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1023.
123. Id. at 1030. The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy clergy,
taxpayer, and voter standing requirements. Id. at 1024-28.
124. Id. at 1031. The court never reached the second and third prongs of Article III
constitutionality considerations or prudential considerations because it found that the
plaintiffs did not meet the first Article III requirement of injury in fact. Id. at 1029 n.2,
1031.
125. Id. at 1029 ("The fatal flaw in [the plaintiffs'] argument is that [they] are not
players in [the same] arena or ... field" as the Church.).
126. Id. at 1030. The particularized injury in fact requirement requires a "distinct
and palpable" injury. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 1029.
128. [d. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's economic competitor cases.
129. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1030.
130. [d.
131. [d.
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plaintiffs' injury as injury to their pro-choice beliefs,'32 the injury re
quirement would be insufficiently particularized. 133 Such an injury to
the plaintiffs' beliefs "would lack a limiting principle [as it] would ef
fectively give standing to any spectator who supported a given side in
public political debate." 134 A lack of limiting principles would contra
vene the Article III separation of powers precepts. 13S
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that in the "stormy sea of this
litigation, it is prudent to closely hug the shores of the pleaded facts
and established law, and not venture out any further than we
must."136 This indicated a policy of strict conformity with the recent
legal trend restricting standing to sue to those litigants with narrow,
private-like claims. 137 A wide range of litigants could assert the plain
tiffs' injury in fact, as characterized by the majority.138 Thus, Catholic
Conference's facts extended too far "off shore" to fall within the pur
view of the modern trend.
The dissenting judge, Judge Newman, disagreed with the major
ity's finding that the plaintiffs and the Church were not "competitors"
within the meaning of competitor advocate theory, 139 and with the
majority's finding that the plaintiffs lacked a sufficiently particularized
injury in fact. l40 Judge Newman found the narrow scope with which
the majority viewed "competitors" unrea1istic. 141 A broader scope, he
stated, would better reflect the multifaceted forms of political competi
tion in a democracy. 142 He argued that competitor political advocates
may choose to oppose each other by expounding their political views
in activities beyond political campaigning. '43 He noted that political
competition could take the form of "speak[ing with] friends and neigh
bors; ... participat[ing] in community activities; [and] devot[ing] ...
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. This broad notion of injury could contravene the prudential considerations
of avoiding general grievances as well. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the prudential policy of avoiding the litigation of generalized grievances.
135. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of modem stand
ing doctrine as being predicated on the separation of powers principle.
136. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031.
137. See supra notes 57-59, 78-82 for a discussion ofthe modem legal trend that uses
the private model of judicial power as its interpretive basis.
138. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
139. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1031-32 (Newman, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 1032.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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.
'
tlme,
... energy, and
sometlmes
... money to ... causes. "144 J u dge
Newman felt that political competition was not limited to adversaries
in a political campaign.'4s
For support, Judge Newman relied on Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bul
lock. l46 In Texas Monthly, the Supreme Court found that the plain
tiff, Texas Monthly, a magazine publisher catering to the general
public, had standing to challenge the tax status of a third party, a
magazine publisher catering to a specific religious audience. 147 Be
cause Texas Monthly was granted standing to challenge the tax status
of a publisher with which it was not in direct competition, Judge New
man interpreted this case to create a broader focus of competition than
that used by the majority in Catholic Conference. 148 Thus, Judge.
Newman found that the plaintiffs and the Church need not have en
gaged in the direct political competition of electioneering to satisfy
injury requirements. 149 Instead, he claimed that sufficient injury ex
isted because the plaintiffs chose "to compete ... by speaking, writing,
and marching, and by championing in countless other ways the cause
of abortion rights."'so
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority's finding that the
plaintiffs lacked a sufficiently particularized injury in fact. He first ar
gued that the majority misdefined the injury .IS I Instead of finding no
injury because the plaintiffs and the Church did not compete with each
other, or defining the injury as one to plaintiffs' beliefs, Judge Newman
argued that the injury in fact was the plaintiffs' "competitive disadvan
tage" flowing from the government's allegedly unequal enforcement of
the tax exemption laws. ls2 He viewed the plaintiffs as competitively
disadvantaged because, being confined to the "insubstantial lobbying
activities" permitted by the tax laws, they could not effectively com
pete on the same level with the Church's stronger political
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989».
147. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8.
148. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge New
man refers to Texas Monthly as an economic competitor case. See id. The Supreme Court
in Texas Monthly, however, never expressly recognized the case as an economic competitor
case nor did it cite to economic competitor precedent. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 7-9.
149. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032.
150. Id. Judge Newman also argued that the court should not have denied the plain
tiffs standing when they obeyed tax exemption laws and the Church allegedly did not obey
these same laws. Id. at 1033. See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 735-36.
151. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1032 (Newman, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1032-33.
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electioneering. 153
Judge Newman next argued that the injury in fact was sufficiently
particularized because the injury was limited to tax- exempt organiza
tions complying with I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (the plaintiffs) and those alleg
edly violating the same tax exemption provision (the Church).154
Judge Newman argued that any injury to parties beyond the purview
of 1.R.e. § 501(c)(3) was "a question far beyond the narrow issue ...
in this case."155 The limiting principle of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), he ar
gued, placed standing in this case "entirely within manageable
bounds." 156

III.

AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE ADVOCATE STANDING
UNDER THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MODELS OF
FEDERAL COURT AUTHORITY

Commentators have argued that the public rights model/private
rights model dichotomy is a fundamental concept that drives all stand
ing analyses. 157 The analytical model that courts adopt will influence
their constitutional and prudential analyses and, ultimately, the deci
sion as to whether or not a litigant has standing to sue. 15S The modem
trend towards restricting standing, which began in the 1970's, has
been attributed to a movement back to the use of the private rights
model as the interpretive basis of standing. 159 Commentators have
criticized the courts' failure to clearly enunciate this movement. l60
The criticism has focused on the ease with which courts can manipu
late the standing analysis in the absence of clearly articulated analyti
cal guideposts.1 61
Id.
Id. at 1033.
Id.
Id. The majority had concluded that the plaintiffs' injury was not cognizable
because it lacked a "limiting principle." Id. at 1030; see also supra notes 132-35 and ac
companying text.
157. See generally Bandes, supra note 2 (arguing for a public law interpretive basis
for all justiciability doctrines associated with Article III, including standing); see also Sun
stein, supra note 14, at 1480 (arguing that the current standing trend incorporates private
model traits).
158. See generally Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1464-66.
159. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1433 ("Recent ... innovations in the law of
standing have started to push legal doctrine in the direction of ... a private-law model of
standing. ").
160. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at III ("The aspect of the Court's standing
jurisprudence most open to criticism ... [is] the Court's lack of candor in articulating and
justifying the basic choice [between public or private law models] it has made.").
161. Id. at 110-11.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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This Section argues that competitive advocate standing has a dual
nature, incorporating traits of both the public and private models of
judicial power. As stated by the Catholic Conference court, competi
tive advocate standing appears to be primarily public in nature. How
ever, the Catholic Conference court's method of applying competitive
advocate standing also evokes strong private model traits. In an effort
to demonstrate competitive advocate standing's dual nature, this Sec
tion analyzes competitive advocate standing as a public model theory
and as a private model theory.
A.

Competitive Advocate Standing as a Public Law Theory

Competitive advocate standing doctrine as stated in Catholic Con
ference requires a litigant to show that the government's failure to en
force a statute unfairly confers an advantage on the litigant's political
competitor. 162 This formulation of the injury in fact requirement ap
pears quite broad. Litigants may claim an indirect injury in fact
merely by showing that their political competitors are favored. 163
Thus, the government need not directly hamper the litigant's competi
tive ability; it only has to favor the litigant's political competitors. l64
Competitive advocate standing's injury in fact requirement ap
pears public in nature because a greater number of plaintiffs could
claim standing to sue the government than would otherwise be permit
ted under the private model of federal court jurisdiction. Standing
would not be restricted to only those claimants in direct, personal
competition with their competitors (Le., those claimants demonstrat
ing injuries specific to themselves). Instead, standing could be granted
to all claimants showing (1) that they directly or indirectly competed
with an opposing party in the political arena and (2) that the govern
162. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Confer
ence, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). A litigant who satisfies these requirements will have met the
Article III injury ,in fact requirement and must further satisfy the causal nexus requirement
together with any prudential considerations. See supra notes 60 -82 and accompanying text
for a discussion of modem standing requirements.
163. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029. "'In the inherently competitive polit
ical arena an advantage granted to one competitor automatically constitutes a hardship to
others.''' Id. (quoting the Complaint ~ 41). See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 726 (noting
that competitive advocate standing injury "results from the granting of an advantage to a
competitor and not from the direct withholding of a benefit due the plaintiff").
164. In its application of competitive advocate standing theory, however, the major
ity narrowed the scope of competitive advocate standing by insisting on head-to-head, per
sonal competition amongst competitors. See Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d at 1029-30.
See infra notes 205- 07 and accompanying text for a private model interpretation of the
majority's requirement of head-to-head competition.
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ment's failure to enforce the law impaired the claimant's ability to
compete with the opposing political competitor. 16S
This greater access to federal courts promotes the public model
view of federal court jurisdiction by increasing the likelihood that fed
eral courts will have to ensure that the government complies with the
law.l 66 Federal courts will have more opportunities to hear claims
against the government and decide whether or not the government is
complying with its own laws.
For example, federal courts would be compelled to rule upon
charges that the government has failed to enforce the law in a non
discriminatory manner in cases where claimants satisfied injury in fact
requirements solely on the basis of indirect injury. In these cases, the
claimant's personal injury, or private right of action, would not exist;
the government would not have breached a common law, statutory, or
constitutional duty that it owed to the claimant. Federal courts would
thus primarily be concerned with ensuring the government's fidelity to
the law. This result would reflect the public law model's view of the
federal courts' primary duty as interpreting the Constitution, not
merely deciding private disputes. 167
The economic competition cases that the Catholic Conference
court relies upon further support the public law interpretation of com
petitive advocate standing. 168 In the economic competitor cases, the
Supreme Court granted litigants standing to sue the government to
enforce statutory regulations where the government conferred unfair
advantages upon an economic comp~titor.169 The Supreme Court ap
165. This broader formulation of competitive advocate standing raises potential
floodgate problems: more litigants would be able to sue in federal courts, and the courts
could thus be unable to cope with the potential flood of competitive advocate cases. But see
Bandes, supra note 2, at 296-97. Responding to floodgate arguments, Professor Bandes
maintains that (1) the public law model has a limiting principle-cases calling for an inter
pretation of the Constitution are preferred; (2) federal courts are currently not too
overburdened to handle public law cases; and (3) even if federal courts are facing an on
slaught of litigation, public law ought to occupy highest priority. ld.
166. Professor Sunstein argues that broadly characterized injuries serve public model
purposes because a greater range of injuries are recognized and the causation requirement
is more easily satisfied. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1464-66. Courts can, therefore,
hear a greater range of suits against the government and can more ably fulfill their public
law function of enforcing the government's fidelity to the law.
167. See Bandes, supra note 2, at 281 (explaining that public theory views the federal
courts' primary role as interpreting and enforcing federal law and the Constitution); see
supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of public model derivations and
purposes.
168. See supra note 91 and accompanying text for the economic cases on which the
court relied.
169. See cases cited supra note 91.
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peared to devalue the injury in fact requirement in favor of a zone of
interests analysis.
In fact, the Supreme Court in Clarke v. Securities Industry
Ass'n,170 a recent economic competitor case, did not even discuss in
jury in fact. 171 Instead, the Supreme Court granted standing to the
plaintiff based on an extensive zone of interests analysis. 172 Commen
tators have argued that Clarke may have rejected the injury in fact
requirement in statutory injury cases in favor of a zone of interests
analysis. 173
The zone of interests analysis requires courts to ascertain whether
the legislature intended a claimant to have standing to sue in a particu
lar context. 174 This emphasis on the zone of interests analysis, similar
to the statutory analysis method that grew from the legal interest
test,175 appears to focus the courts' judicial powers primarily on ensur
ing governmental compliance with the law, and secondarily on con
stricting itself to ruling upon traditional private rights. Thus, the
public model appears to be the analytical basis for the economic com
petitor cases relied upon by Catholic Conference.
Applying the public law interpretation of competitive advocate
standing to the facts of Catholic Conference, it is likely that the out
come would have been different; the court would have granted stand
ing to the plaintiffs. Injury in fact, the first constitutional prong,
would have been satisfied because, using the broad scope of political
competition advocated by dissenting Judge Newman,176 the Church
170. 479 U.S. 388 (1987). In Clarke, a trade association representing firms in the
securities industry contested a Comptroller of the Currency ruling that allowed two banks
to provide discount brokerage services to the public. Id. at 390-93. The trade association
maintained that the ruling violated § 36(c) of the McFadden Act. Id. at 392-93 (citing
McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 7,44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (1988»).
171. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 393 n.5.
172. Id. at 400-03.
173. Id. at 401-03; Fletcher, supra note 12, at 263-64 ("[T]he Court's rejection of
Data Processing's two-step inquiry into the existence of standing must be regarded as a
significant clarification, and improvement, of standing law."); Coyle, supra note 12, at
1077-78. Discussing the Court's failure to analyze injury in Clarke, Mr. Coyle argues that
Clarke establishes a new standing inquiry limited to a "zone of interests" analysis. Id. He
further argues that Clarke indicates that the "zone of interests" test would apply to all
A.P.A. claims and most other claims as well. Id.
174. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399; see Fletcher, supra note 12, at 264-65 ("[T]he touch
stone [in a standing inquiry] is statutory intent: Does the statute confer on plaintiff the
right to enforce the asserted duty?").
175. See supra notes 41- 45 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 139- 45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of
Judge Newman's view of political competition.
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and the plaintiffs could have been found to be political competitors.
They supported and voiced opposing opinions on the abortion issue.
Moreover, the causal nexus requirement of traceability and
redressability l77 may have been satisfied by arguing that were the
Church threatened with revocation of its tax-exempt status, it would
have likely stopped electioneering and conformed to the non-partisan
requirements ofl.R.C. § 501(c)(3) so as to ensure its survival. 178 Reli
gious organizations like the Catholic Church depend for their liveli
hood on tax-exempt status and tax deductible donations; 179 revocation
177. Judges and commentators lllike have noted that the causal nexus requirement is
extremely malleable. They argue that the causal nexus requirement is susceptible to conjec
ture on the merits, how the injury in fact is framed, and the analytical model the court
chooses to use. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(Causation is "no more than a poor disguise for the Court's view of the merits of the
underlying claims."); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-18; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1464-65.
178. But see Allen, 468 U.S. at 756-59. The Supreme Court in Allen ruled that the
impact of tax exemption revocation on the racially discriminatory practices of some private
schools was "entirely speculative." Id. at 758. Because the revocation would not have, in
the Court's view, necessarily cured the discriminatory conduct of the private schools, the
causal nexus requirement of Article III was not satisfied. The Court therefore denied plain
tiffs standing to sue. Id. at 758-59. See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26,40-46 (1976) (holding that, when the defendants' response to tax exemption
revocation was unclear, the causal nexus was broken and standing to sue was therefore
denied). See supra note 57 for a more detailed discussion of Allen.
It could be argued that revocation of the Church's tax- exempt status would have pro
duced the same specUlative result: the Church, free of any electioneering restrictions, may
then have pursued its political objectives openly and more vigorously. See D.B. ROBERT
SON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 227 (1968). If the Church's response to revocation
of its tax- exempt status would have been uncertain, the causal nexus requirement would
have been broken and an alternate ground for denial of standing established. See Allen, 468
U.S. at 758-59; Simon, 426 U.S. at 40-46.
179. Commentators have argued that the revocation of tax-exempt status for reli
gious organizations would sound the death knell for economically unstable religious organi
zations. See ROBERTSON, supra note 178, at 228; THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION 1968942
(Donald R. Cutler ed. 1968). These commentators have further argued that revocation of
tax-exempt status would force even economically stable religious organizations to restrict
or cut off their community activities altogether to focus on fiscal survivorship. See ROB
ERTSON, supra note 178, at 228; THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION 1968, supra, at 942. A 1978
survey of Rochester, N.Y.-area churches confirms this severe impact. See Vaughn Pol
menteer, Some Don't Have to Pay, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Apr. 9, 1978 (Mag
azine), at 5. For example, one Rochester-area Roman Catholic church, the Blessed
Sacrament Church, figured' that, based on the 1978 tax rate, its tax-exempt status repre
sented $81,900, approximately half of its annual budget. Id. The Church's pastor pre
dicted that the Church would have to close its school and cut back community programs
without tax exemption. Id.
The government also has an interest in exempting religious organizations like the
Church from taxation. The Supreme Court has stated that tax exemption of religious orga
nizations is necessary to ensure the separation of church and state. The Court has argued
that the taxation process would create excessive entanglement between church and state by
involving the government in valuations and assessments of church property. See Walz v.
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of their I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) status would likely curtail donations and
severely hamper their ability to function as religious organizations. 18o
Were the Church to conform to the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) requirements,
the plaintiffs' injury of reduced political effectiveness vis-a-vis the
Church would be redressed-both the Church and the plaintiffs would
be competing with the same non-partisan activity restrictions.
League of Women Voters can also be argued to have adopted the
public law model as an analytical basis. The League of Women Voters
court used a broad focus in determining that Fulani had a sufficient
injury in fact. 181 For example, it found that the loss of Fulani's com
petitive advantage from exclusion in the League's debate was sufficient
injury in fact. 182 This injury was based on the diminished political
stature and recognition that allegedly resulted from exclusion from the
debates. 183 However, the court could not offer evidence as to the spe
cific value that media coverage would have had to Fulani. It could
only make a general statement that Fulani could have lost "some com
petitive advantage" from her inability to participate in the debates. 184
It is difficult to see how such general injury meets the "distinct
and palpable" requirement of Article III injury in fact. All eighty-two
1988 presidential candidates could have feasibly claimed Fulani's loss
of "some competitive advantage." Yet the Second Circuit, using a
broad focus, was willing to look past such vagaries and traditional
standing concepts to find sufficient injury in fact.18S
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675-76 (1970). But see John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption 0/
Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
363, 366-67 (1991) (arguing that the Court's excessive entanglement argument is "con
trived" because the government is already closely involved in church activities through the
zoning, landmarking, and incorporation processes).
180. See discussion supra note 179. See generally Glenn Goodwin, Note, Would
Caesar Tax God? The Constitutionality o/Governmental Taxation o/Churches, 35 DRAKE
L. REV. 383 (1986). Arguing that the exemption of churches from taxes is constitutionally
mandated, Mr. Goodwin states: "To grant the state the power to impose such a tax on a
church would be equivalent to granting the state the power to control or suppress the
religious activities ofthe church. 'The power to tax involves the power to destroy.''' Id. at
400 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819».
181. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
182. League 0/ Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 626.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
185. Perhaps the court's holding was motivated by its observation that denial of
standing in this case "would [have] impl[ied] that such a candidate could never challenge
the conduct of the offending agency or party." League 0/ Women Voters, 882 F.2d at 626.
In other words, the Second Circuit may have loosened injury in fact requirements in the
interest of allowing a party to sue to enforce an agency's obligations and to avoid effectively
screening a federal agency's actions from judicial review. The Supreme Court, however,
expressly rejected use of this policy to grant standing. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
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Fulani's claim to standing under a public law analysis may be
buttressed with a zone of interests analysis of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The
main problem with this statutory analysis is that, because no hearings
were held when the electioneering prohibition was enact~d, no clear
legislative intent with regard to the purpose of I.R.e. § 501(c)(3) is
ascertainable. 186 However, one commentator has argued that Con
gress intended to protect partisan activists not able to claim the full
benefits of I.R.e. § 501(c)(3) against I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations
who are able to enjoy the I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) benefits of deductible con
tributions and tax exemption. 187 Thus, a "purpose of the [I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3)] restriction is to discourage the [I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) benefi
ciaries] from creating an unfair imbalance in the political arena."188
Under this interpretation of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), Fulani would be
within the ambit of the statute's protection because she was engaging
in partisan activities by running for political office. Using the public
model of judicial authority, Fulani would have standing to sue the
government to enforce the government's fidelity to the law. 189
Additional support for a public rights model interpretation of
League of Women Voters is found in Fulani v. Brady.190 In Brady, a
case involving exactly the same facts, plaintiff, and legal issues as
League of Women Voters, the United States District Court for the Dis
trict of Columbia expressly rejected the findings of League of Women
Voters .191
The District Court for the District of Columbia denied Fulani
standing based on its finding that her injury was "speculative" and
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) ("The assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.").
186. See Coyle, supra note 12, at 1100-01.
187. Id. See also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
14-16 (5th ed. Supp. 1991) and ROBERT L. HOLBERT, TAX LAW AND POLITICAL ACCESS:
THE BIAS OF PLURALISM REVISITED 27 (1975) for a recounting of the legislative history
behind I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
188. Coyle, supra note 12, at 1101.
189. Alternately, this interpretation of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) may hamper the plaintiffs
as they were not engaged in partisan political activity-I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) barred them
from doing so.
190. 729 F. Supp. 158 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C.
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992). For a discussion of the appellate court
decision, see infra note 197.
191. Brady, 729 F. Supp. at 162. One difference between League of Women Voters
and Brady is that the defendant in League of Women Voters was the League of Women
Voters. On the other hand, the defendant in Brady was the United States Government,
specifically, Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas F. Brady and Internal Revenue Service
Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs.
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"attenuated at best."192 The district court reasoned that it was too
hard to determine "with any degree of reasonableness" what gain me
dia coverage actually bestowed upon Fulani's competitors and, con
versely, what degree of harm was conferred upon Fulani. 193 There
were too many variables 194 on which to base a "meaningful" evalua
tion of her harm. 195
The Brady district court refused to adopt the broader view of in
jury in fact espoused by the League of Women Voters court 196 and
found that Fulani's injury did not satisfy narrowly drawn injury re
quirements. Thus, the district court's criticism of League of Women
Voters' broad scope indicates that the Second Circuit in League of
Women Voters was more lenient in its analysis of injury in fact. 197 The
Second Circuit's willingness to bypass stringent standing requirements
in favor of deciding the case on the merits fulfilled its public law duty
of ensuring government fidelity to the law.
When viewed as a public law theory, competitive advocate stand
ing would probably have produced similar results in both League of
Women Voters and Catholic Conference-both plaintiffs would have
had standing to sue. 198 There may, however, be an alternate explana
tion for the denial of standing in Catholic Conference, even under a
192. Id.
193. Id. at 163.
194. For example, the court noted that media exposure is of questionable value as
evinced by then Vice President Bush's request for "less rather than more opportunities to
engage in debate appearances." Id. at 163 n.8. The court saw the amount of increase in
public recognition from debate appearances and the factors composing political stature as
variables that were not reasonably quantifiable. Id. at 162-63.
It can be argued, however, that media exposure is greatly beneficial to a relatively
unknown candidate, like Fulani, because the media exposes the candidate to an audience
that may never have heard of the candidate. Unlike then Vice-President Bush, who had an
abundance of media exposure and may have sought to limit it, Fulani, and other minor
party candidates in her position, was faced with a paucity of media exposure. Fulani
would, therefore, have sought as much media exposure as possible.
195. Id. at 162.
196. Referring to the League of Women Voters decision, the District Court for the
District of Columbia stated: "[M]erely stating the obvious [value of debates] does not sub
stitute for analysis of the injury requirement in Article III standing." Id.
197. In affirming the district court opinion, the appellate court stressed the lack of
causation and redressability. Fulani v. Brady, 935 F.2d 1324, 1328-31. The appellate court
majority never once took a clear stance on whether injury in fact existed; it merely stated
what Fulani alleged her injury to be. See. e.g., id. at 1326 ("According to Fulani, [the
sponsor of the presidential debates] directly injured her by depriving her of the media cov
erage ...."); but see id. at 1332 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "the majority does
not dispute the constitutional sufficiency of Fulani's alleged injury"). The appellate court,
however, did not expressly disagree with the district court's injury in fact analysis.
198. A public law analysis is thus reconcilable with the holding in League of Women
Voters and irreconcilable with the holding in Catholic Conference.
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public law analysis. Courts have traditionally been hesitant to grant a
litigant standing to litigate the tax liability of a fellow taxpayer.199
This policy is based on two grounds: a fear of "widespread litigation,
uncertainty, and unfortunate stare decisis effects";200 and a negative
inference of congressional intent-Congress could not have intended
to imply standing to assess another's tax liability when it specifically
granted standing to some taxpayers and not others. 201 This policy
may have informed the court's decision not to grant the plaintiffs
standing in Catholic Conference because they were asking the court to
rule on the tax liability of a fellow taxpayer, the Church. 202 Perhaps
the court's stated policy of strict conformity with prior case law 203
implicitly recognized the judicial policy against allowing standing to
assess a fellow taxpayer's tax liability.204
199. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In his
concurrence in Simon, Justice Stewart stated: "I cannot now imagine a case, at least
outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own tax liability was not affected
ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of someone else." Id. at 46
(Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart's quote stating the policy against standing to litigate another taxpayer's
tax liability has given rise to vigorous arguments over how to characterize injury in fact.
For example, Chief Judge Mikva, the dissenting judge in the Brady appellate court deci
sion, argued that Fulani's "core allegation" was based on a restriction of her First Amend
ment rights: the government's discriminatory enforcement of the laws suppressed her
ability to express her political ideas. Brady, 935 F.2d at 1333 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
Reading Justice Stewart's opinion to state that individuals raising First Amendment- based
claims could contest the tax liability of fellow taxpayers, Chief Judge Mikva argued that
because Fulani had a First Amendment-based injury, Fulani had standing to litigate the tax
liability of the debate sponsor. Id.
The majority in the Brady appellate court decision, however, characterized Fulani's
claim as rooted in the tax liability of a fellow taxpayer. Id. at 1326-27. Thus, the majority
argued that Justice Stewart's opinion weighed against the granting of standing to Fulani.
Id. at 1327.
See also Dunec, supra note 88, at 479-81. Ms. Dunec argues that granting standing to
litigate nonprofit organizations' tax liability "could have a chilling effect on the very exist
ence of nonprofit, charitable organizations." Id. at 481.
200. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1454 n.105.
201. Id. For examples of specific grants of standing for taxpayers, see 26 U.S.C.
§§ 7422, 7426, 7428-7429 (1988).
202. As relief, the plaintiffs requested the revocation of the Church's tax-exempt sta
tus. In re United States Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference,
110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990). Thus, the Church's tax liability would have increased from tax-free
liability to fully taxable liability.
203. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
204. Of course, this same policy against litigation of a fellow taxpayer's tax liability
would apply to League of Women Voters because Fulani was litigating the League's tax
liability.
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B. Competitive Advocate Standing as a Private Rights Model
Theory

Though competitive advocate standing is in some measure public
in nature, the Second Circuit's application of competitive advocate
standing in Catholic Conference also demonstrates its strong private
law traits. These traits were especially evident in the court's interpre
tation of the competition requirement; the court interpreted competi
tion to require head to head personal competition. 205 The plaintiffs
could have satisfied such exacting injury requirements only by match
ing the Church's electioneering with their own, thereby breaking the
law. 206
This view of competition effectively narrows disputes cognizable
under competitive advocate standing to those disputes that have
strong private-model-like characteristics. 207 A personal competition
requirement eliminates a broad range of potential litigants, especially
those posing more abstract claims. Personal competition thus also
serves as a limiting principle and helps avert any potential floodgate
effects of a broad interpretation of competition.
The Catholic Conference outcome would be justified under a pri
vate law model interpretation of competitive advocate standing. As
the Catholic Conference majority argued, the plaintiffs lacked suffi
cient injury in fact because they were not in direct personal competi
tion with the Church-the plaintiffs did not electioneer; the Church
did. Without a sufficient injury in fact, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy
Article III standing requirements. 208
The court's opinion in League of Women Voters is not as easily
reconciled with the private model since the court used the language
205. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
206. Such a view might have the negative consequence of encouraging lawless self
help in order to meet standing requirements. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) litigants may violate the
tax exemption rules by engaging in electioneering to meet the Catholic Conference's exact
ing head to head injury requirement. See supra note 101 for a discussion of I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) requirements.
207. Professor Sunstein argues that narrowly defined injuries "move the [standing]
doctrine sharply in the direction of the private-law model [of federal court jurisdiction]
...." Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1457. A narrow characterization of an injury makes the
causation requirements extremely difficult to prove and thereby eliminates all but the nar
rowest private claims. Id. at 1463-66. See also id. for a discussion of the impact the char
acterization of injury has on causation requirements and, ultimately, on standing
determinations.
208. In addition, it could have been argued that the causal nexus was not satisfied
either. See supra notes 177- 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of causal nexus in
Catholic Conference.
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and approach of a public model.209 However, the facts of this case fit
nicely within the private model: Fulani was a direct competitor who
alleged that she suffered direct personal injury caused by the govern
ment's breach of its duty to allow presidential candidates to compete
on an equal basis.
Additionally, Fulani arguably satisfied the head to head competi
tion requirement. After all, Fulani was competing with the major
party candidates for one job, the United States presidency. It is diffi
cult to envision any more direct competition than that which exists
when a group of people compete for one job. 210
League of Women Voters and Catholic Conference may be recon
cilable under a private law analysis that uses as its normative model a
more specific form of political competition-partisan electoral compe
tition. Like competitive advocate standing, partisan electoral competi
tion would grant political competitors standing to sue where the
government unfairly conferred advantages upon a political competitor.
Unlike competitive advocate standing, however, a partisan electoral
competition would allow standing to sue only where the competitors
were engaged in partisan electoral activity.
The restrictive focus of partisan electoral competition would pro
mote private model purposes by narrowing the field of potential claim
ants to electoral aspirants and by weeding out mere issue advocates.
Political activists directly oppose fellow competitors by running
against each other as candidates for political office or by campaigning
for political candidates. Thus, within the realm of political activity
there is a high likelihood of direct personal competition.
Recognizing standing in cases involving partisan electoral compe
tition would also help protect an important value: ensuring an equal
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. The importance of
this value is evident in a line of Supreme Court cases beginning with
Williams v. Rhodes. 211 In these cases, the Court repeatedly protected
209. The League of Women Voters court's adoption of the public model is all the
more convincing when viewed in light of the district court's decision in Fulani v. Brady;
See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of League of Women Voters
as a public model case.
210. It can also be argued, however, that the personal competition requirement does
not necessarily correlate with use of the private model. Where the group of people in
personal competition with one another is large (such as the 82 aspirants for the 1988 presi
dency), an individual's claim becomes more public in nature; anyone person in the large
group would be able to assert the claim.
211. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See also Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992); Anderson
v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974);
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). For a discus
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political parties' access to the ballot from unreasonably burdensome
government restrictions. 212 Partisan electoral competition would fur
ther this value by granting standing to political competitors so that
they could challenge unfair enforcement of laws affecting their ability
to compete in the political arena.
The court in Catholic Conference would probably have arrived at
the same conclusion under a partisan electoral competition analysis.
The plaintiffs were merely non-partisan issue advocates, not partisan
activists. 213 Though the plaintiffs may indeed have suffered an injury
because they were not able to voice their side of the abortion issue as
loudly as one of their competitors, the Church, their injury would not
be cognizable under a partisan electoral competition theory. The
plaintiffs were not opposing the Church as partisan activists. 214 Their
sion of the Supreme Court cases dealing with restrictions on political parties' access to the
ballot, see GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 849-54 (12th ed. 1991).
212. See. e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31. Justice Black, writing for the majority,
invalidated Ohio election laws that placed "unequal burdens" on the right of individuals to
exercise their "right ... to associate for the advancement of political beliefs." Id. at 30.
Applying strict scrutiny to the laws, he found no compelling interest that justified the
abridgement of such "precious freedoms." Id. at 30-31.
213. As an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, the plaintiffs were barred from partisan
activities. See supra note 101 for a discussion of I.R.C. § 501(cX3) requirements.
214. A question exists as to whether one plaintiff, the Nassau, Long Island branch of
the National Organization for Women ("Nassau NOW"), would have standing under com
petitive advocate standing and partisan electoral standing. The majority in Catholic Con
ference stated that "[P]artly as a result of [the] self-imposed restraint, plaintiffs chose not to
compete [on the same political playing field as the defendants)." In re United States Catho
lic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Abortion Rights
Mobilization, Inc. v. United States Catholic Conference, 110 S. Ct. 1946 (1990).
It is not clear from where the self-imposed restraints were derived. If the court as
sumed that Nassau NOW, an organization formed under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), was not able
to electioneer because of its tax exemption restrictions, the decision concerning Nassau
NOW would not be convincing.
Like I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations, Nassau NOW is tax-exempt. As an I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(4) organization, however, Nassau NOW (1) has the right to engage in election
eering and (2) does not have the benefit of receiving tax deductible donations. Thus, Nas
sau NOW was free to compete on the same political playing field as the Church. Nassau
NOW would meet the head to head competition requirement that prevented the I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) plaintiffs from satisfying competitive advocate standing (or partisan electoral
standing). Moreover, Nassau NOW would satisfy the unfair competition requirements of
competitive advocate standing and partisan electoral standing because the Church, an
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization, still retained the benefit of tax deductible donations while
Nassau NOW was able to solicit fully taxable donations only. See id. at 1033-34 (Newman,
J., dissenting).
If, on the other hand, Nassau NOW imposed electioneering restrictions upon itself and
refused to electioneer against the Church as a matter of principle, Nassau NOW would lack
standing under both partisan electoral standing and competitive advocate standing, as in
terpreted by the Catholic Conference majority. Nassau NOW would not have engaged in
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remedy would lie in the political process where they could solicit the
Executive Branch to enforce relevant laws.
The outcome of League of Women Voters under a partisan electo
ral competition analysis would also be justified. Fulani could have sat
isfied the injury in fact requirement using partisan electoral
competition theory because, by campaigning for office, Fulani was en
gaging in partisan electoral activities just as were her competitors, the
major party presidential candidates invited to the League's debates.
The Article III causal nexus requirement could be satisfied using the
League of Women Voters' analysis. Fulani would satisfy the traceabil
ity requirement because, but for the League's tax-exempt status, there
would have been no debate. 2ls In addition, Fulani's injury would have
been redressed because "practically speaking, revocation of the
League's tax- exempt status at least would have prevented the
League's sponsorship of the debates"216 and her injury would not have
occurred.
CoNCLUSION

Analysis of League of Women Voters and Catholic Conference in
dicates that these cases incorporate both private and public models of
judicial authority. Failure to provide guidance as to what model of
judicial authority underlies competitive advocate standing creates the
potential for confusion217 and abuse,218 especially in light of the fact
that the courts' choice of interpretive model may be outcome-determi
native. The lack of clear interpretive guidance substantiates the criti
cism often leveled by commentators that courts manipulate standing
as an ad hoc tool for admitting or denying cases depending on the
political bent of the particular court. 219
the required partisan activity, nor would it have been in head-to-head competition with the
Church. See id. at 1030.
215. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 628 (2d Cir.
1989). But see id. at 630-33 (Cardamone, J., concurring) (arguing that Fulani failed to
satisfy the causal nexus requirement).
216. Id. at 628.
217. See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 110. Professor Tribe maintains that the
current trend towards restricting standing to limit federal court jurisdiction based on the
private rights model of Marbury is legitimate. But, he argues, the methods used to restrict
standing are confusing and provide little guidance as to what constitutes justiciable litiga
tion. Id.
218. Courts will be able to seize upon either model of judicial authority to justify
their standing decisions.
219. See. e.g., TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3-14, at 110-11 ("[C]ritics have charged the
Court with habitually manipulating announced standing doctrine to pursue extraneous,
often unacknowledged ends."); Nichol, supra note 12, at 1917 (describing how critics of the
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Much of the potential for abuse and confusion may be eliminated
if the Second Circuit would expose the interpretive basis of competi
tive advocate standing to free and open debate and, based on the de
bate, adopt a model of judicial authority. Adoption of a model of
judicial authority would hold courts accountable to following that
model on a consistent basis. Though there would be room for disa
greement within the adopted model,220 courts would not be able to
choose arbitrarily any model in an attempt to justify their competitive
advocate standing holdings.

Peter M. Seka

current trend towards constricting standing requirements argue that courts are more inter
ested in the "underlying claims rather than any objective measurement of injury"); David
A. Domansky, Note, Abusing Standing: Furthering the Conservative Agenda, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 387, 414 (1988) (arguing that standing law as used by the Burger Court was
"little more than a convenient vehicle to promote the conservative agenda").
220. Ambiguity within each conceptual realm may continue to exist. For example,
the district and appellate courts in Fulani v. Brady implicitly adopted a private rights
model and ruled that Fulani lacked standing. 729 F. Supp. 158 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd on
other grounds, 935 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992). In
Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, arguably a private model case, the court
held oppositely: Fulani did have standing. Thus, even if one were to interpret both deci
sions as incorporating the private model, the outcomes would be contradictory. See supra
notes 209-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of League of Women Voters as a
private model case. For further discussion of the relationship between the two Fulani
cases, see supra notes 190 -97 and accompanying text.

